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FOREST GUARDIANS V. FORSGREN AND NFMA PLANNING
REFORM: THE RETURN OF MAXIMUM FOREST SERVICE
DISCRETION
INTRODUCTION
In Forest Guardians v. Forsgren,1 the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held United States Forest Service "forest plans" do not constitute
ongoing agency action sufficient to confer standing under the Endan-
gered Species Act ("ESA"), 2 except at adoption, amendment, revision, or
when authorizing site-specific decisions.3 Forest Guardians is the latest
in a line of cases limiting federal court jurisdiction over claims challeng-
ing federal land management plans, including Ohio Forestry Association
v. Sierra Club4 and Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance ("Nor-
ton").5 Opposing this line of cases limiting standing in plan challenges is
a body of case law, generally coming out of the Ninth Circuit, broadly
interpreting ESA's "action" requirement. 6 This comment contrasts the
Forest Guardians decision and other pertinent case law with the wider
push by the Forest Service to maximize its discretion through rulemak-
ing. The Forest Service will soon adopt planning regulations limiting its
legal obligations to a greater degree than that contemplated by the Tenth
Circuit in Forest Guardians.
Part I briefly outlines the basic legal and factual issues surrounding
the Forest Guardians controversy. Part II examines in more detail the
statutory background to the case and the forest planning reform process,
discussing the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), ESA, and
the National Forest Management Act ("NFMA"). Part III reviews the
Forest Guardians opinion. Part IV assesses some proposed revisions to
Forest Service planning regulations, arguing that the proposed rules go
too far in weakening legal obligations and public oversight constraining
national forest management. This part also discusses some likely impli-
cations of the new planning regulations and suggests a proper balance
between Forest Service managerial discretion and public accountability.
This comment concludes by contrasting the likely impact of Forest
Guardians and the new planning regulations on national forest manage-
1. 478 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 2007).
2. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531-1544 (2008).
3. 478 F.3d at 1154-56, 1159-60.
4. 523 U.S. 726 (1998).
5. 542 U.S. 55 (2004).
6. See generally Turtle Island Restoration Network v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 340 F.3d
969 (9th Cir. 2003); Pac. Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 1994); Citizens for
Better Forestry v. USDA, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1095 (N.D. Cal. 2007); see also Sierra Club v. U.S.
Dep't of Energy, 255 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1189 (D. Colo. 2002).
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ment in coming years and briefly revisiting the controversy over protec-
tions for the lynx in New Mexico.
I. REINTRODUCTION OF THE CANADA LYNX AND THE FOREST
GUARDIANS CONTROVERSY
Forest Guardians involved the refusal of Forest Service managers
in New Mexico to initiate consultation over the 1999 reintroduction and
2000 ESA listing of the Canada lynx (lynx canadensis) as threatened just
across the state line in southern Colorado. In early 1999, the Colorado
Division of Wildlife ("DOW") began to reintroduce the lynx in Colo-
rado.7  Although historical evidence indicated a lynx presence in Colo-
rado,8 considerable controversy surrounded both state reintroduction
efforts9and the national movement to protect the lynx under the Endan-
gered Species Act ("ESA").' ° The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
("FWS") issued a final rule listing a Distinct Population Segment
("DPS") of Canada lynx as threatened in 14 states, including Colorado
but excluding New Mexico, in 2000.11 In time, some lynx released in
Colorado emigrated to neighboring states. Colorado DOW tracked re-
leased lynx into Nebraska, Utah, and New Mexico by 2001.12
In 2004, Forest Guardians, 13 an environmentalist group, filed suit
against the United States Forest Service for failing to review its forest
management plans in the Carson and Santa Fe National Forests 14 to en-
7. See TANYA SHENK, GENERAL LOCATIONS OF LYNX (LYNX CANADENSIS) REINTRODUCED
TO SOUTHWESTERN COLORADO FROM FEBRUARY 4, 1999 THROUGH FEBRUARY 1, 2005, 1 (2005),
http://wildlife.state.co.us/NR/rdonlyres/F92E6FCD-BCB5-4711-8EE6-
A9398EA77999/O/LynxLocationsFeb2005.pdf.
8. See, e.g., Colo. Env't Coal. v. Dombeck, 185 F.3d 1162, 1168-69 (10th Cir. 1999); Final
Rule Determining Threatened Status for the Canada Lynx, 65 Fed. Reg. 16052 (2000) (to be codified
at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) [hereinafter 2000 Listing]; Erika Trautman, Will Listing Hurt the Colorado
Lynx?, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Jan. 21, 2002, available at http://www.hcn.org/servlets/
hcn.Article?articleid= 10963.
9. See, e.g., Mindy Sink, The Long-Elusive Lynx Is Returned to Colorado, N.Y.TIMEs, Feb.
4, 1999, at A20; see also Allen Best, Lynx Reintroduction Links Unexpected Allies, HIGH COUNTRY
NEWS, May 10, 1999, available at http://www.hcn.org/servlets/hcn.Article?article id-4976.
10. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531-1544 (2008); see Mark Matthews, Case of the Missing Lynx Sparks
Studies, Debate, WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 16, 1998, at A3.
11. 2000 Listing, supra note 8.
12. See TANYA M. SHENK, POST-RELEASE MONITORING OF LYNX REINTRODUCED IN
COLORADO: ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT FOR THE U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE DECEMBER
2001 (2001), available at http://www.cde.state.co.us/artemis/nr6/nr6219920054intemet.pdf.
13. See Forest Guardians, http://www.fguardians.org (last visited Feb. 2, 2008).
14. See Forest Guardians v. Forsgren, 478 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 2007). The Carson National
Forest covers 1.5 million acres of land in northern New Mexico ranging from 6,000 to 13,161 feet in
elevation, including mountainous terrain similar to that designated as critical lynx habitat across its
northern border, the Colorado state line. Parts of the forest are located in a portion of the southern
San Juan Mountains geographically contiguous with the portion of the San Juans in which lynx were
originally released in Colorado. See Carson National Forest, http://www.fs.fed.us/r3/carson/
index.shtml [hereinafter Carson National Forest Homepage] (last visited Feb. 2, 2008). The Santa
Fe National Forest is located on 1.6 million acres generally located on the southern borders of the
Carson, and is comprised of similar terrain, including the southern end of the San Juan Mountains.
See Santa Fe National Forest, http://www.fs.fed.us/r3/sfe/about/about-forest.htmt [hereinafter Santa
Fe National Forest Homepage] (last visited Feb. 2, 2008).
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sure activities authorized under the plans did not harm lynx inhabiting
these northern New Mexico forests.' 5 In the suit, Forest Guardians ar-
gued the ESA listing required the Forest Service to review the impact of
its forest plans for the Carson and Santa Fe forests on the lynx and to
consult with Fish and Wildlife on how to mitigate any harm caused to the
lynx, or lynx habitat, in the forests.'
6
The U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico rejected
Forest Guardians' claims.' 7 Forest Guardians appealed to the Tenth Cir-
cuit, which affirmed the trial court ruling on different grounds.18 The
Tenth Circuit failed to reach the issue of the 2000 DPS listing's exclu-
sion of New Mexico, 19 holding instead that national forest management
plans developed pursuant to NFMA20 do not constitute "ongoing agency
action" under Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA.21 Section 7(a)(2) requires fed-
eral agencies contemplating action to consult with FWS (or the National
Marine Fisheries Service, "NMFS") concerning the potential impacts of
the action on threatened and endangered wildlife and critical habitat.
22
The Tenth Circuit's decision relied on the U.S. Supreme Court's 2004
holding in Norton that Bureau of Land Management land management
plans were not ongoing agency action under the National Environmental
Policy Act ("NEPA");23 the court used the Norton holding to limit the
instances in which plaintiffs could challenge agency inaction with regard
to forest plans and the ESA duty to consult.
24
The Tenth Circuit's consideration of the planning issue in Forest
Guardians occurred during a lengthy process of Forest Service rulemak-
ing likely to result in removal of significant substantive and procedural
standards for developing forest plans.25 The Forest Service's proposed
planning rules maximize agency flexibility in the planning process, es-
chewing the more prescriptive, accountability-oriented approach of the
recent past.26 Although the Forest Service claims its new managerial
approach will enable it to better manage the national forests in the future,
removal of protections embedded in the forest planning process threatens
to purchase managerial flexibility and decisional efficiency at the price
15. Adam Rankin, Groups'Suit Says Lynx Not Protected, ALBUQUERQUE JOURNAL, Feb. 11,
2004, at 5.
16. Id.
17. Forest Guardians, 478 F.3d at 1152.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1600-1687 (2008).
21. Forest Guardians, 478 F.3d at 1159.
22. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(a)(2) (2008).
23. Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 73 (2004); 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-
4370f (2008).
24. See Forest Guardians, 478 F.3d at 1152-56.
25. See generally UNITED STATES DEPT. OF AGRIC., USDA FOREST SERVICE STRATEGIC
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of binding legal obligation and effective public oversight of national for-
est management.2 7
II. SOURCES OF STATUTORY OBLIGATION: NEPA, ESA, AND NFMA
Forest Guardians involves two statutes-ESA28 and NFMA.2 9 Ac-
cordingly, this Part focuses on federal agencies' duty to consult under
ESA and the Forest Service's planning obligations under NFMA. Dis-
cussion of the impacts of NEPA on forest planning, to the extent this
comment discusses such impacts in any depth, is limited to Section IV;
however, a brief introduction to some general NEPA requirements is
appropriate at this point.
A. NEPA: The Duty to Assess Environmental Impacts
NEPA requires federal agencies to "take a hard look at the envi-
ronmental consequences of their actions., 30 To this end, NEPA requires
federal agencies to prepare "a detailed environmental impact statement
("EIS") for 'all major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality
of the human environment.' 31 Given the qualified language of the stat-
ute and the complexity of environmental factors involved in forest man-
agement and planning, the EIS requirement has generated an enormous
amount of litigation involving the Forest Service. 32 In addition to impos-
ing procedural requirements on federal agencies, NEPA also vests agen-
cies with some discretion as to the manner of complying with those re-
quirements. NEPA permits the agency to complete an environmental
assessment ("EA") "as a preliminary step in determining whether the
environmental impact of the proposed action is significant enough to
warrant an EIS. ' 33 If the EA leaves questions "as to whether the project
may cause a significant degradation of some human environmental fac-
tor," the agency must prepare an EIS. 34 If the agency finds no such im-
pact is likely to occur, it may issue a "finding of no significant impact"
("FONSI") and proceed with the project.
35
Regulations promulgated by the Council on Environmental Quality
("CEQ") have provided agencies a third, more controversial means of
27. See id.
28. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531-1544 (2008).
29. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1600-1687 (2008).
30. Citizens for Better Forestry v. USDA, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1080 (N.D. Cal. 2007)
(quoting High Sierra Hikers Ass'n v. Blackwell, 390 F.3d 630, 639 (9th Cir. 2004)).
31. Id. at 1080 (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332(2)(C) (2008)).
32. See, e.g., Nat'l Audubon Soc. v. Hoffman, 132 F.3d 7, 18 (2d Cir. 1997) (Forest Service's
decision not to prepare EIS in conjunction with building of a logging road was arbitrary and capri-
cious where the agency ignored substantial evidence in the administrative record that significant
impacts were likely); Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606, 615-17 (7th Cir. 1995) (Forest Service
required to prepare EIS prior to adoption of forest plan).
33. Citizens, 481 F. Supp. 2d at 1080.
34. Id. at 1081.
35. Id.
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NEPA compliance, the categorical exclusion ("CE"). An agency may
"categorically exclude" from NEPA analysis categories "of actions
which do not individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the
human environment., 36  Perhaps unsurprisingly, federal agencies have
attempted to use CEs to exclude major projects from NEPA analysis,
with mixed results.37 Given the complexity of NEPA's environmental
analysis requirements, 38 litigation arising from Forest Service compli-
ance efforts has been a perennial thorn in the side of the agency.
B. ESA: Agencies'Duty to Consult
Congress passed the Endangered Species Act in 197339 in order to
protect threatened and endangered species and their habitat.40 The ESA
authorizes the Secretary of the Interior (through the federal wildlife
agencies) to designate species as endangered or threatened and to desig-
nate "critical habitat" for such species.4 ' Upon designation and "listing,"
federal agencies contemplating action must develop and implement "re-
covery plans" as appropriate for aiding in species recovery. 42  Listing
also triggers applicability of a number of enumerated offenses involving
takings of the listed species,4 3 although parties may obtain "incidental
take permits" for listed species. 44 Likewise, federal agencies may apply
for exemption from ESA mandates under provisions added in 1978 and
1979.45 The ESA also contains a broad citizen-suit provision.46
Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA requires federal agencies to consult with
federal wildlife authorities to insure proposed actions are "not likely to
jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or result in
the destruction or adverse modification of [the critical] habitat of such
species. '' 47 Upon determining a species may be present in the area of a
proposed action, the agency must prepare a biological assessment to
36. Id.
37. Compare West v. U.S. Dep't of Trans., 206 F.3d 920, 928-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding
Federal Highway Administration's application of a CE for "changes in access control" to construc-
tion of a major highway interchange was arbitrary and capricious) with Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v.
U.S. Forest Serv., 189 F.3d 851, 853-54 (9th Cir. 1999) (affirming Forest Service's application of
CE for "approval, modification, or continuation of minor short-term ... special uses of National
Forest land" to issuance of commercial helicopter permits).
38. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-4370f(2008).
39. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 159 (1978).
40. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531(b) (2008) ("The purposes of this [Act] are to provide a means
whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered and threatened species depend may be conserved,
to provide a program for the conservation of such endangered species and threatened species .....
41. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1533(a)-(b) (2008).
42. § 1533(f).
43. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1538, 1540 (2008).
44. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (2008).
45. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(g) (2008); see also Jared des Rosiers, The Exemption Process under
the Endangered Species Act: How the "God Squad" Works and Why, 66 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 825
(discussing ESA exemption process).
46. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1540(g) (2008).
47. § 1536(a)(2).
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identify "any endangered species or threatened species" likely to be af-
fected by the proposed action.48 If the agency's biological assessment
concludes that the proposed action is likely to produce adverse effects, it
must initiate formal consultation. 49 Formal consultation culminates with
issuance of a biological opinion by the responsible wildlife agency.50
The biological opinion expresses the wildlife agency's opinion as to
whether the proposed action is likely to have adverse impacts on threat-
ened or endangered species or critical habitat, and provides alternatives
to the proposed action that will allow the acting agency to avoid violating
Section 7(a)(2)'s substantive "no jeopardy" mandate.5' If the agency
goes forward with the action over a biological opinion finding adverse
impacts or jeopardy are likely to result, it will be in violation of the Sec-
tion 7(a)(2) mandate.
Given that an agency must contemplate some "action" in order to
trigger Section 7(a)(2)'s consultation and "no-jeopardy" requirements,
the question of precisely what constitutes "action" under the ESA has
generated significant litigation.53 ESA regulations define action as "all
activities or programs of any kind authorized, funded, or carried out, in
whole or in part, by Federal agencies in the United States or upon the
high seas" 54 but also state that Section 7 requirements apply only to "ac-
tions in which there is discretionary involvement or control. 55 The regu-
lations list specific categories of agency "action" including actions "in-
tended to conserve listed species or their habitat" or "directly or indi-
rectly causing modifications to the land, water, or air," agency rulemak-
ing, contracting, licensing, and so on.56  The Supreme Court's recent
decision in National Association of Home Builders reads Section 7(a)(2)
narrowly where actions arguably non-discretionary in nature are con-
48. § 1536(c)(1).
49. See § 1536(a)(2); Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 763 (9th Cir. 1985).
50. § 1536(b)(3).
51. See id.
52. Thomas, 753 F.2d at 763 (noting agency failure to adopt prudent alternative to proposed
action as outlined in biological opinion likely to constitute a violation of ESA); Am. Rivers v. U.S.
Army Corps of Eng'rs, 271 F. Supp. 2d 230, 257-58 (D.D.C. 2003) (agency in violation of ESA
where failure to adopt prudent alternatives outlined in biological opinion rendered significant take of
threatened species imminent).
53. See generally Citizens for Better Forestry v. USDA, 341 F.3d 961 (9th Cir. 2003) (agency
decision to relax forest planning requirements an "action" under § 7(a)(2)); Pac. Rivers Council v.
Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 1994) (forest plan an agency action requiring consultation with FWS
under § 7(a)(2)); Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (agency decision to complete
construction and commence operation of a dam constituted "action" under § 7(a)(2)); but see Nat'l
Assoc. of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518 (2007) (§ 7(a)(2) consultation
requirement does not apply where agency action is non-discretionary and required by statute); Cal.
Sportfishing Prot. Alliance v. FERC, 472 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2006) (operation of project under FERC
license not agency action under § 7(a)(2)); Envir. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Simpson Timber Co., 255 F.3d
1073 (9th Cir. 2001) (FWS lacked sufficient discretionary control over previously issued incidental
take permit to require re-initiation of § 7(a)(2) consultation).
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cerned;57 other circuits have adopted this approach as well.58 However,
past cases where the meaning of agency "action" under the ESA was at
issue show the courts formerly took a broader view on what constitutes
"action" under Section 7(a)(2).59
1. Pacific Rivers Council v. Thomas
60
In Pacific Rivers, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals relied on the
U.S. Supreme Court's Tennessee Valley Authority ("TVA") v. Hill6l
opinion to support its holding that a Forest Service land and resource
management plan constituted ongoing agency action under Section
7(a)(2) of the ESA.62 In TVA v. Hill, the Court held that the ESA insti-
tuted a discretion-constraining policy of "institutionalized caution" that
required federal agencies, "in the plainest of words," to ensure their ac-
tions did not adversely impact threatened or endangered species or their
critical habitat.63 Relying on the TVA v. Hill opinion, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed a district court preliminary injunction on future Forest Service
actions in the Wallowa-Whitman and Umatilla National Forests of Ore-
gon pending consultation with the NMFS on potential impacts on the
recently listed Snake River Chinook salmon, and reversed the lower
court's denial of a requested injunction against ongoing projects in the
two forests.64
The Forest Service urged the Ninth Circuit to recognize that forest
plans constitute agency action for Section 7(a)(2) purposes only when
adopted, amended, or revised, as opposed to on an ongoing basis.65 The
Ninth Circuit flatly disagreed, adopting a rule that forest plans are "ongo-
ing agency action" under the ESA because they have an "ongoing and
long-lasting effect" on individual projects implemented in a forest unit,
even after adoption, amendment, or revision.66 The court stated that the
plain language of both the statute and corresponding regulations 68 indi-
cated clear congressional intent to define agency action broadly,69 back-
ing its claim by citing TVA v. Hill's "institutionalized caution" discus-
sion.70 Consistent with its view that forest plans "have ongoing effects
57. Home Builders, 127 S. Ct. at 2536 (2007); but see id. at 2542 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
58. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 65 F.3d 1502, 1509 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding § 7(a)(2)
consultation duty not triggered where agency action was non-discretionary in nature).
59. See, e.g., Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 172-73 (1978).
60. 30 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 1994).
61. Id. (agency decision to complete construction and commence operation of a dam consti-
tuted "agency action" triggering ESA § 7(a)(2) consultation requirements).
62. Id. at 1053.
63. Tenn. Valley Auth., 437 U.S. at 172-74, 194.
64. Pac. Rivers, 30 F.3d at 1051-52.
65. Id. at 1053.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1054.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1054-55.
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extending beyond their mere approval, 71 the court held that forest plans
are ongoing agency action under Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA.72
2. National Association of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife
73
In National Association of Home Builders ("Home Builders"), the
Supreme Court held that the Section 7(a)(2) consultation and "no-
jeopardy" requirements were not triggered by agency actions non-
discretionary in nature. 74 Home Builders concerned a challenge by envi-
ronmentalist groups to FWS's determination that transferal of pollution
discharge permitting authority from the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") to the State of Arizona did not require the EPA to con-
sider "indirect impacts" of the transfer on threatened and endangered
species in the consultation process. 75 As the EPA was bound by the
Clean Water Act ("CWA") 76 to transfer permitting authority to the state
upon state compliance with nine criteria contained in the statute,77 the
Court treated the transfer as a non-discretionary act within the meaning
of ESA regulations,78 holding the transfer did not trigger Section
7(a)(2)'s consultation and "no-jeopardy" requirements.79
3. Summary: Scope of the Agency Duty to Consult and Forest
Planning
In general, the ESA offers protections to threatened and endangered
species and their critical habitat, and offers citizens standing to challenge
agency actions and inactions, but both the substantive protections and
standing conferred are limited by the terms of the statute, corresponding
regulations, and case law. 80 On the other hand, the issue of Forest Ser-
vice discretion in land use management and planning is far broader than
ESA compliance, which deals exclusively with species preservation and
protection. 8 1 To the extent Forest Guardians uses the issue of Section
7(a)(2) requirements as a starting point for analyzing the legal effect of
forest plans, the opinion hinges on legal sources of obligation extraneous
to the ESA.82 The Forest Service, to a greater extent than any other fed-
eral land management agency, is subject to a myriad of statutory and
71. Id. at 1055.
72. Id. at 1056.
73. 127 S. Ct. 2518 (2007).
74. Id. at 2533-36.
75. Id. at 2528-29.
76. 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387 (2008).
77. See Home Builders, 127 S. Ct. at 2531.
78. Id. at 2535-36.
79. Id. at 2536, 2538.
80. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1531 (2008).
81. See Forest Guardians v. Forsgen, 478 F.3d 1149, 1151 (10th Cir. 2007).
82. See id. at 1151-52.
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regulatory authorities. 83  Primary among these, perhaps, is the Forest
Service's "second" organic act, NFMA.84
C. NFMA, Planning, and Forest Service Discretion
Timber is the central character in the story of the Forest Service and
NFMA. Timber resources in the United States were exploited at an in-
credible rate during the 19th century.85 In 1891, Congress moved to stop
the alarming "collapse" of the nation's timber supply, passing legislation
permitting the President to "reserve" forestlands in the federal public
domain.8p In 1897, after several years of haggling over statutory lan-
guage, 87 Congress passed the "Forest Service Organic Act" ("FSOA"),88
which created a national forest reserve system to provide for watershed
protection and timber conservation and supply.89  The Forest Service
focused, from the outset, on ensuring a stable and perpetual commercial
timber supply.90 Gifford Pinchot, the first chief of the Forest Service, 91
viewed the national forests as a vast warehouse of natural resources, and
viewed "sustained yield" timber production as their central purpose.92
Pinchot's "multiple use" philosophy, which argued that the forests could
successfully accommodate logging, watershed protection, grazing, wild-
life habitat, and recreation through scientific management, did not come
into conflict with the sustained yield mandate during the early years
when timber demand was low. 93 Multiple use initially translated into
maximized Forest Service discretion, which "in practice meant freedom
to log wherever logging could be accommodated." 94 War demand and
the postwar housing boom, which coincided with a decline in private
timber reserves, led to an explosion in timber demand and harvesting on
the national forests during the 1940s and 1950s, 95 with large-scale har-
vesting peaking in the 1960s and 1970S.96 As part of a new "intensive
management" approach to maximizing production,97 the Forest Service
83. Robert Breazeale, Is Something Wrong with the National Forest Management Act?, 21 J.
LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 317, 323 (2001).
84. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1600-1614 (2008).
85. See W. Va. Div. of Izaak Walton League of Am. v. Butz, 522 F.2d 945, 950 (4th Cir.
1975) (noting only 500 million acres out of approximately one to one and one quarter billion acres of
American forests existing at the end of the 18th century remained uncut in 1893).
86. PAUL W. HIRT, A CONSPIRACY OF OPTIMISM: MANAGEMENT OF THE NATIONAL FORESTS
SINCE WORLD WAR Two xvii (1994).
87. Izaak Walton League, 522 F.2d at 950-52.
88. Id. at 952 (also known as the "Pettigrew Amendment"); see also 16 U.S.C.A. § 476 (re-
pealed 1976).
89. Izaak Walton League, 522 F.2d at 950-52; see also 16 U.S.C.A. § 476 (repealed 1976);
HIRT, supra note 86, at 32.
90. See HIRT, supra note 86, at 31-32.
91. Id. at 31-33.
92. Id. at 32, 34.
93. Id. at 35-36.
94. Id. at 36.
95. See id. at 45, 50-53.
96. See id. at xxiv.
97. See id. at 55-57.
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instituted "even-aged management," including major clear-cutting, on a
wide scale, beginning in the western forests and then moving east.
98
Simultaneous to the spike in timber harvesting was a dramatic in-
crease in recreational use of the national forests,99 inevitably leading to
use conflicts and straining the multiple use concept. 100 In reaction to
these developments, Congress passed the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield
Act ("MUSYA") in 1960.101 As its name indicates, the law attempted to
reconcile the evolving policies of managing the forest for multiple uses'
0 2
and sustained yield of its renewable surface resources. 0 3 Section 528 of
MUSYA required the administration of forests for "range, timber [and]
watershed" uses, but also for "outdoor recreation" and "fish and wildlife
purposes."' 4 MUYSA also provided that the listed purposes were "sup-
plemental to, but not in derogation of, the purposes for which the na-
tional forests were established,"' 0 5 (i.e., timber production and watershed
protection).
0 6
Perhaps because it left so much discretion in the Forest Service,
MUYSA failed to ameliorate growing use conflicts.'0 7 In the wake of
MUSYA, the stage was set for passage of NFMA:
During the 1960s the Forest Service had continued to increase timber
sales and also had expanded the use of clearcutting. These practices
generated severe criticism [across] the country. Critics of the Forest
Service called for remedial action by Congress. The agency's legal
authority to clearcut was also challenged in court. On August 21,
1975, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled in the famous
Monongahela case that the 1897 [FSOA] effectively prohibited cle-
arcutting in the national forests. The Forest Service and timber inter-
ests sought congressional relief to correct the offending language in
the [FSOA].' 8
Congress passed NFMA'0 9 in 1976, ostensibly to rein in the Forest
Service's timber-centric management practices. 10 NFMA repealed the
98. See W. Va. Div. of Izaak Walton League of America v. Butz, 522 F.2d 945, 955 (4th Cir.
1975).
99. See HIRT, supra note 86, at 52-53 (discussing dramatic increase in recreational use of the
national forests during 1940s and 1950s).
100. Id. at 53.
101. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 528-531 (2008); see CHARLES F. WILKINSON & H. MICHAEL ANDERSON,





106. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 714-15 (1978); see also 16 U.S.C.A. § 476
(repealed 1976).
107. See WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 101, at 69-70.
108. Id. at 41-42; see also W. Va. Div. of Izaak Walton League of Am. v. Butz, 522 F.2d 945,
955 (4th Cir. 1975).
109. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1600-1614 (2008).
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FSOA 11 and implemented a planning regime to guide forest manage-
ment 1 2 and required the Forest Service to develop a comprehensive
management plan for each national forest ("forest plan"). 13 The forest
plan serves as a statement of policy and information to guide future man-
agement decisions in the forest" 14 and designates which areas within a
unit are suitable for timber harvesting
15 and a myriad of other uses." 16
NFMA also requires forest plans be "implemented" through "site-
specific" projects such as timber sales, area closures, orders changing
approved uses of specific sections of the forest, and so on,17 and that all
site-specific activities be consistent with the forest plan for the forest unit
where they take place."
8
Section 6 of NFMA outlines substantive and procedural require-
ments for Forest Service forest plans, 19 requiring forest managers to
"develop, maintain, and, as appropriate, revise" a written forest plan for
each unit in the system. 120 Forest managers must use "a systematic inter-
disciplinary approach to achieve integrated consideration of physical,
biological, economic, and other sciences,"' 12' and must develop regula-
tions governing the development and revision of forest plans.' 22 Regula-
tions must provide for NEPA compliance, 123 ensure plans contain infor-
mation on use designation 124 and biological diversity, 125 and require the
agency to study the impacts of the forest plan management system on
forest productivity. 126 A temporarily convened "committee of scientists"
appointed by the Secretary of Agriculture aids the agency in developing
these regulations. 127 Plan development is subject to public notice and
comment requirements 128 and plans must conform to a number of spe-
cific restrictions on timber harvesting. 29  Unlike the ESA,13 ° NFMA
110. See Citizens for Better Forestry v. USDA, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1064 (N.D. Cal. 2007);
see also Izaak Walton League, 522 F.2d at 953; GAIL L. ACHTERMAN, K. NORMAN JOHNSON &
SUSAN K. STEVENS, NFMA and FLMPA: Fifteen Years of Planning, in PUBLIC LAND LAW 5-1, 5-13
(Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation 1992); WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 101, at 70-
72; HIRT, supra note 85, at 260-65.
111. HIRT, supra note 86, at 263.
112. See Citizens, 481 F. Supp. 2d at 1064.
113. See id. (forest plans are also referred to as "land resource management plans" or
"LRMPs" );see also § 1604(a).
114. Citizens, 481 F. Supp. 2d at 1064; see § 1604(f)-(g), (i).
115. § 1604(k).
116. See § 1604(e)(1).
117. Citizens, 481 F. Supp. 2d at 1064.
118. ld; § 1604(i).
119. See § 1604.








128. §§ 1604(d), 1612(a).
129. See § 1604(g)(3).
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lacks a citizen-suit provision, and thus challenges to NFMA forest plans
have generally been made under the Administrative Procedure Act
("APA"). 131 Because agency action is a threshold question for standing
and reviewability under the APA, the success or failure of claims chal-
lenging NFMA planning, like Section 7(a)(2) ESA claims, often turns on
how courts define "agency action."
1. Ohio Forestry Association v. Sierra Club
132
In Ohio Forestry Association v. Sierra Club, the Supreme Court en-
dorsed the proposition that forest plans do not constitute "ongoing"
agency action sufficient to confer APA standing. In Ohio Forestry, the
Sierra Club challenged a forest plan developed for the Wayne National
Forest in southeastern Ohio, which permitted extensive logging and
clear-cutting in the forest. 133 Sierra Club variously alleged the plan vio-
lated NFMA, NEPA, and the APA. 34  The Court rejected the claim,
holding forest plans do not constitute agency "action" for standing pur-
poses. 135 The Court determined that adoption of the plan did not create
any immediate legal or practical harm necessitating review,"36 that the
agency was entitled the opportunity to revise or refine plan provisions
through site-specific proposals before review,137 and that the plan did not
provide an adequate factual basis for review. 38  The Court noted the
inconvenience of challenging plan-level prescriptions via individual site-
specific actions, but instructed plaintiffs to wait until such projects were
proposed before trying to challenge provisions within a forest plan.'39
2. Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance
140
In Norton, the Supreme Court held that BLM resource management
plans do not generally impose legally binding requirements on the
agency.'41 The Federal Land and Policy Management Act ("FLPMA")
142
requires the BLM to prepare unit-level "land management plans" for
130. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(a)(2) (2008).
131. See, e.g., Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 731 (1998). Claims under
NFMA and NEPA are usually made under § 702 of the APA, which provides a right of action to any
person "adversely affected or aggrieved" by or "suffering legal wrong because of' agency action. 5
U.S.C.A. § 702 (2008). Section 706 permits the courts to "compel agency action unlawfully with-
held or unreasonably delayed." 5 U.S.C.A. § 706(1) (2008). Section 704 reads, in pertinent part,
"[a]gency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no other
adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review." 5 U.S.C.A. § 704 (2008).
132. 523 U.S. 726 (1998).
133. Id. at 729-30.
134. Id. at 731.
135. Id. at 732-39.
136. Id. at 733-35.
137. Id. at 735-36.
138. Id. at 736-37.
139. Id. at 733-35.
140. 542 U.S. 55 (2004).
141. Id. at 72.
142. 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1701-1785 (2008).
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BLM lands 143 just as NFMA requires the Forest Service to prepare unit-
level forest plans for the national forests. 44 The Southern Utah Wilder-
ness Alliance ("SUWA") claimed the BLM's land management plan for
the Henry Mountains unit of central Utah required the agency to develop
and implement an intensive, formal monitoring program for off-road
vehicle ("ORV") use in the Factory Butte area.
145
The Court rejected this argument, concluding that "a land use plan
is generally a statement of [agency] priorities,"' 146 not a prescriptive
document imposing affirmative obligations on the agency. 147 Acknowl-
edging that land use plans constrained the range of actions an agency
could take, 148 the Court concluded that plan language that seemed to re-
quire specific agency actions only "projected" future agency actions.
149
Plans could "guide and constrain" agency action, but could not prescribe
such action. 1" ° The Court reasoned that judicial interference with agency
planning would simply lead agencies to create deliberately vague plans
to limit grounds for legal challenges, "ultimately operat[ing] to the det-
riment of sound environmental management."' 151  Overall, the Norton
Court viewed land management plans as non-binding, aspirational docu-
ments. 1
52
3. Citizens for Better Forestry v. USDA
153
The Northern District of California considered the forest planning
issue in early 2007 in Citizens for Better Forestry v. USDA ("Citizens"),
which involved a challenge to a Forest Service planning rule, the 2005
Final Rule ("2005 Rule"). 54 Adopted without public notice and com-
ment, completion of an EIS, or ESA consultation or study, 155 the 2005
143. See Norton, 542 U.S. at 58-60.
144. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1604 (2008); see also WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 101, at 64
(citing 43 U.S.C. §§ 1715, 1716, 1751-1753 (1982)) (noting FLMPA contains sections applicable to
the Forest Service, including provisions on "acquisition of land, exchanges of land, and grazing
within the national forests.").
145. Norton, 542 U.S. at 68.
146. Id. at 71.
147. Id. at 69-71.
148. Id. at 69.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 71.
151. Id. at 71-72. But see Justin C. Konrad, Comment: The Shrinking Scope of Judicial Re-
view in Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 515, 540 (2006) (arguing
that clear legal obligations increase quality of federal land management).
152. Compare Norton, 542 U.S. at 71, with Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726,
733 (1998), and 2005 Final Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 1023, 1031 (Jan. 5, 2005) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R.
pt. 219). See also 2005 Final Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at 1032 (citing Ohio Forestry for the proposition
that "timber management provisions of land management plans are tools for further agency planning
and guide, but do not direct future development.").
153. 481 F. Supp. 2d 1059 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
154. 2005 Final Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 1023 (Jan. 5, 2005).
155. Citizens, 481 F. Supp. 2d at 1067. Simultaneously, the Forest Service issued a separate
categorical exclusion exempting "all proposals to develop, amend, or revise land use plans which did
not approve particular projects or site-specific activities." Id.
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Rule relaxed forest planning requirements to a far greater degree than
earlier planning rules.' 56 Although the Citizens controversy centered on
planning rules as opposed to plans themselves, the case crystallized
competing interpretations of forest planning. An assortment of environ-
mentalist plaintiffs argued the Forest Service's failure to provide for pub-
lic notice and comment, complete NEPA analysis, or conduct ESA con-
sultation on the 2005 Rule violated NFMA, NEPA, and ESA. The Forest
Service argued these requirements were inapplicable because planning
rule changes had a "practical effect"'157 that was "minimal" and the 2005
Rule "simply establishe[d] a process for planning" and was "not an ac-
tion having a direct effect on threatened or endangered species.' 58
This take on the nature of planning regulations mirrors the Forest
Service's position on forest plans in Ohio Forestry - that planning has
minimal impact on forest conditions and is basically administrative and
"aspirational" in nature. The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument and
ordered the Forest Service to resubmit the 2005 Rule for APA, NEPA,
and ESA compliance; the agency responded by essentially re-issuing the
2005 Rule as a "2007 Proposed Rule."
III. FOREST GUARDIANS V. FORSGREN
159
A. Facts/Procedural History
In Forest Guardians v. Forsgren, Forest Guardians argued the For-
est Service was required under the ESA to consult with Fish and Wildlife
regarding impacts on the Canada lynx under the Carson and Santa Fe
forest plans. 60 To support its position, Forest Guardians argued the Car-
son and Santa Fe forest plans constituted consultation-triggering "ongo-
ing agency action,' 1 61 relying on the Ninth Circuit's holding in 1994's
Pacific Rivers Council. 1
62
The U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico granted the
government's motion to dismiss the complaint. 63 Because the 2000 list-
ing of the lynx as threatened did not include New Mexico, where the
entirety of the Carson and Santa Fe National Forests are located, the dis-
trict court held that the Forest Service was not obligated to consult with
FWS on the potential impacts of the forest plans on the lynx. 64 Forest
156. See id. at 1067, 1073-74, 1076.
157. Id. at 1075.
158. Id. at 1068.
159. 478 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 2007).
160. Id. at 1151.
161. Id. at 1152.
162. Pac. Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050, 1051-52 (9th Cir. 1994).
163. Forest Guardians, 478 F.3d at 1152.
164. Id.
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In considering whether the Forest Service was required under Sec-
tion 7(a)(2) of the ESA to consult on the impacts of the forest plans, the
Tenth Circuit began with the Supreme Court's holding in Norton that
BLM land use plans do not constitute agency action once adopted.
166
The court then reviewed provisions in NFMA and Forest Service plan-
ning regulations. 67 The court noted the regulations define a "plan" as "a
document or set of documents that integrates and displays information
relevant to management of a unit of the National Forest System.' 68 The
court further noted that forest plans had to be implemented by site-
specific projects consistent with their terms16 9 and were subject to NEPA
analysis. °70 Although the court expressed "little doubt" that forest plans
could constitute agency action under the ESA at adoption, amendment or
revision, or when approving a site-specific decision, the court concluded
that forest plans were not "ongoing, self-implementing action under §
7(a)(2)" of the ESA.
17 1
The court noted that if forest plans did not constitute ongoing
agency action and Forest Guardians failed to allege any other agency
action triggering Section 7(a)(2)'s consultation requirement, then the
Forest Service was not required to consult with FWS on the impact of the
Carson and Santa Fe plans on the lynx. 72 The court noted that Forest
Guardians failed to cite "an authorized program, practice, project, or
activity that might amount to 'action' threatening the continued existence
of the lynx" and sustaining the complaint. 73 For this reason, the Tenth
Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint.
74
Acknowledging that "policies, directions, and allowances" con-
tained in a forest plan might have "indirect" adverse impacts on wildlife
and critical habitat, the court concluded that such effects did not trans-
form forest plans into agency "action" triggering Section 7(a)(2) consul-
tation. 175 As the court noted, "[p]olicies and directions only guide the
Forest Service in determining whether an 'action' may be properly un-
165. See id at 1152.
166. Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 73 (2004); Forest Guardians, 478
F.3d at 1153.
167. Forest Guardians, 478 F.3d at 1153.
168. Id; 36 C.F.R. § 219.16 (2005).
169. Forest Guardians, 478 F.3d at 1154.
170. Id. Compare id, with Citizens for Better Forestry v. USDA, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1067-
68 (N.D. Cal. 2007), and 2005 Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 1023-01, 1032, 1040 (Jan. 5,2005).
171. Forest Guardians, 478 F.3d at 1154-55.
172. Seeid. at 1156.
173. Id. at 1157.
174. Id. at 1160.
175. Id. at 1157.
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dertaken" under a given plan and do not "commit the Forest Service to
anything."' 76 Designations of permitted uses in certain unit areas like-
wise did not constitute agency action under Section 7(a)(2), as these des-
ignations were subject to change through revision or amendment of the
forest plan. 1
77
The court rejected the Ninth Circuit's holding in Pacific Rivers
Council that forest plans constitute ongoing agency action under Section
7(a)(2) of the ESA.178 The court argued that site-specific decisions con-
stituted the "action" contemplated by Section 7(a)(2), not the plans them-
selves, and that the Ninth Circuit erred in concluding otherwise.
179
IV. FOREST GUARDIANS, NFMA PLANNING REFORM, AND THE AGENCY
DISCRETION QUESTION
Forest Guardians stands for two basic propositions: that forest
plans are not "ongoing" agency action for purposes of the ESA, and that
citizens necessarily lack standing under the ESA to challenge forest plans
except at adoption, amendment, or revision, limiting the scope of agency
"action" under which citizens can seek review. The Tenth Circuit's deci-
sion to affirm on these grounds transplanted the rule that land manage-
ment plans are not challengeable "ongoing agency action" from the
NEPA context in Norton to the ESA context, 180 adopting the Forest Ser-
vice's interpretation of forest plans as not legally binding on an ongoing
basis. Forest Guardians supports the treatment of forest plans consistent
with increased managerial discretion in federal land agencies like the
Forest Service.1
8 1
There are good arguments to be made on both sides of the "a plan is
just a plan" debate. As the Ninth Circuit recognized in Pacific Rivers,
forest plans guide project-level activities on an ongoing basis.' 82  Be-
cause NFMA requires all site-specific actions to be consistent with the
guidelines and provisions of an individual forest plan, 183 forest plans
clearly exercise some ongoing, constraining influence on forest man-
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1158.
178. Id. at 1159.
179. Id.
180. Compare id. at 1158, with Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 71 (2004).
181. Forest Guardians, 478 F.3d at 1153; see also id. at 1156 n.9. Interestingly, the court also
declined to rely on Ohio Forestry for its holding that forest plans are unchallengeable except at
adoption, amendment, or revision, even though the Supreme Court essentially laid out the same rule
in the same context-NFMA forest planning, as opposed to BLM planning at issue in Norton. The
explanation for reliance on Norton instead of Ohio Forestry likely lies in the nature of the agency
"action" challenged. In Norton, agency inaction was at issue, whereas the challenge in Ohio For-
estry was to the forest plan's authorization of specific harvesting practices. The Tenth Circuit likely
chose to rely on Norton instead of Ohio Forestry because Forest Guardians sought to compel the
Forest Service to initiate consultation rather than revise a specific provision of the plan (i.e., to
compel specific action in the face of agency inaction rather than enjoin an agency action).
182. See Pac. Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050, 1051-52 (9th Cir. 1994).
183. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1604(i) (2008).
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agement actions. 184 If forest plans legally bind the Forest Service on an
ongoing basis, it is reasonable to argue they confer standing under the
applicable statutory citizen-suit provisions (e.g., APA and ESA) on an
ongoing basis as well. On the other hand, the inconsistency of a site-
specific decision with the applicable forest plan is perhaps best addressed
by challenging the decision itself rather than the plan.185
Forest Guardians is the latest in a line of cases limiting citizen
standing to challenge forest and other federal land use plans. 186 The For-
est Service's revision of its forest planning regulations over the last sev-
eral years, by contrast, noticeably weakens the agency's statutory obliga-
tions to a greater degree than Forest Guardians.187 Contrasting in detail
some major differences between the 1982 Forest Service planning regu-
lations, under which the vast majority of forest plans currently in place
were developed, and new proposed regulations likely to take effect
within the next year illuminates the agency's use of rulemaking to
maximize its discretion.
A. Revising NFMA Planning Regulations
In 1996, legal scholar and historian Charles Wilkinson reviewed the
evolution of Forest Service management in the twenty years since pas-
sage of NFMA, noting improvements in the Service's technical ap-
proach, changes in the makeup of agency leadership and personnel, the
slow decline of the timber industry's influence on the agency, the central
role of biodiversity in modem Forest Service land management, and the
agency's success in democratizing the planning process by engaging the
public in management decisions. 88  The Forest Service, which essen-
tially exercised "unquestioned professional judgment" over forest man-
agement prior to passage of NFMA in 1976,189 has pointed to these and
other developments to justify its push toward maximizing its managerial
discretion. 90
184. Pac. Rivers, 30 F.3d at 1051-56.
185. See Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 734 (1998).
186. See, e.g., id. at 734-35.
187. See, e.g., 2007 Proposed Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. 48514, 48526-27 (Aug. 23, 2007) (to be
codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 219) (authorizing categorical exclusion of forest plans from environmental
analysis under NEPA); Robert B. Keiter, Ecological Concepts, Legal Standards, and Public Land
Law: An Analysis and Assessment, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 943, 950 (2004).
188. Charles Wilkinson, The National Forest Management Act: The Twenty Years Behind, the
Twenty Years Ahead, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 659, 673-74 (1997).
189. Martin Nie, The 2005 National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning
Regulations: Comments and Analysis, 27 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 99, 105 (2006).
190. See id. at 100. The Forest Service has also cited project delays caused by litigation under
various federal statutes as justification for its regulatory reforms. See U.S. FOREST SERVICE, THE
PROCESS PREDICAMENT: How STATUTORY, REGULATORY, AND ADMINISTRATIVE FACTORS
AFFECT NATIONAL FOREST MANAGEMENT 7, 19 (2002) [hereinafter PROCESS PREDICAMENT],
available at http://www.fs.fed.us/projects/documents/Process-Predicament.pdf (discussing litigation
related delays to California timber salvage project and wildfire recovery project).
2008]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
Although parts of the 1982 Planning Rule mirrored the broader, less
prescriptive language of NFMA, 191 other provisions subjected planners to
meaningful substantive constraints; 92 the rule required each forest plan
to embody meaningful limits on timber harvesting' 93 and to provide for
species viability194 and biodiversity, 195 and required the agency to com-
plete a comprehensive EIS for each forest plan.' 96 By the 1990s, how-
ever, the Forest Service was chafing under what it viewed as unreason-
able and unnecessary administrative burdens imposed by the 1982
Rule.' 97 The Clinton Administration provided the political will to follow
through on developing a new rule in the late 1990s.' 98
The resulting 2000 Planning Rule controversially placed biodiver-
sity at the heart of agency planning priorities.' 99 The 2000 Rule simpli-
fied and streamlined the planning process by updating planning standards
to reflect changes in the Service's scientific knowledge and technical
capabilities, 20 0 but did not abandon the standards-based approach of the
1982 Rule.20' Whatever its merits, the 2000 Rule had no impact on forest
202 TeBsplanning. The Bush Administration suspended the 2000 Rule pending
administrative review in early 2001.203 The Forest Service subsequently
decided the 2000 Rule failed to sufficiently simplify and streamline the
planning process2°4 and issued a transitional rule in 2002 pending open-
ing of notice and comment on new planning regulations. 205 The agency
then issued a final planning rule on January 5, 2005, without doing
NEPA or ESA compliance.20 6 In contrast to the 2000 Rule, the 2005
Rule relaxed existing planning requirements considerably.20 7 The North-
191. See, e.g., Keiter, supra note 187, at 946.
192. See, e.g., id at 946-47.
193. See, e.g., 1982 Rule, 36 C.F.R. §§ 219.14-.27 (1982).
194. Id. § 219.19.
195. Id. § 219.26.
196. Id. § 219.12.
197. See, e.g., 2007 Proposed Rule, 72 Fed Reg. 48514-01, 48515 (Aug. 23, 2007) (to be
codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 219); 2005 Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 1023-01, 1024, 1027 (Jan. 5, 2005).
198. See Keiter, supra note 187, at 948 (noting the Clinton Administration's commitment to
"instilling a new ethic in the public land agencies . .
199. See id. at 964.
200. See 2000 Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 67514, 67516 (Nov. 9, 2000); see also Citizens for Better
Forestry v. USDA, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1065 (N.D. Cal. 2007); Wilkinson, supra note 188, at 672-
73.
201. See Keiter, supra note 187, at 962.
202. See Utah Envtl. Cong. v. Bosworth, 483 F.3d 1127, 1132 (10th Cir. 2007) (noting the
transitional provision of the 2000 Rule permitted forest planners to base site-specific decisions on a
"best available science" standard instead of the substantive provisions of the 2000 Rule); Ecology
Ctr. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 451 F.3d 1183, 1190-91 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting the substantive provisions
of the 2000 Rule were never implemented).
203. Citizens, 481 F. Supp. 2d at 1065.
204. See 2007 Proposed Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. 48514-01, 48515 (Aug. 23, 2007) (to be codified at
36 C.F.R. pt. 219).
205. Ecology Ctr., 451 F.3d at 1190; 2002 Proposed Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. 72770 (Dec. 6, 2002)
(to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 219).
206. Citizens, 481 F. Supp. 2d at 1067-68.
207. See infra notes 187-272 and accompanying text.
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em District of California, however, invalidated the new rule in 2007,
ordering the agency to comply with the APA, NEPA, and ESA when
developing new planning rules. 20 8 The Forest Service complied with the
court order by essentially re-proposing the same rule. 209 Notice and
comment on the proposed rule ran until October 22, 2007.2'0 A brief
review of some of the changes proposed in the 2007 Rule is appropriate.
1. Species Viability and Monitoring
Section 219.19 of the 1982 Rule required forest planners to provide
for the management of fish and wildlife habitat by devising plans geared
toward "maintain[ing] viable populations of existing native and desired
non-native vertebrate species in the planning area.",21' Section 219.19
specifically defined a "viable population" as "one which has the esti-
mated numbers and distribution of reproductive individuals to insure its
continued existence is well distributed in the planning area," and re-
quired plans to provide for habitat sufficient "to support, at least, a
minimum number of reproductive individuals.., well distributed so that
those individuals can interact with others in the planning area.,
212
Section 219.19(a)(1) required the Forest Service to monitor the ef-
fects of forest management on "management indicator species"
("MIS"). 213 MISs were to be selected, "where appropriate," from federal
and state endangered and threatened species, species with "special habi-
tat needs," species "commonly hunted, fished, or trapped," "non-game
species of special interest," and "additional plant or animal species se-
lected because their population changes are believed to indicate the ef-
fects of management activities on other species of selected biological
communities or on water quality.,
214
Section 219.19(a)(1) further required that the agency analyze the ef-
fects of management practices on species viability "on the basis of avail-
able scientific information". 21 5 By contrast, the 2007 Rule requires only
that monitoring "take into account" the best available science, weakening
the standard.216 The 2007 Rule also relaxes procedures for changing a
208. Citizens, 481 F. Supp. 2d at 1100.
209. 2007 Proposed Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. at 48515.
210. Id.
211. 1982 Rule, 36 C.F.R. § 219.19 (1982).
212. Id.
213. Id. § 219.19(a)(1).
214. Id.
215. Id. (emphasis added).
216. Compare id., with 2007 Proposed Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. 48514-01, 48536, 48538 (Aug. 23,
2007) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 219). The term "best" is wholly subjective and practically
meaningless; because courts will be especially reluctant to second-guess agency discretion on tech-
nical matters, this term is likely to allow the Service to substitute science, consistent with its pre-
ferred policies for more valid science that contradicts those policies. Second, "available" narrows
further the range of science the Service must account for-namely, to the science the Service
chooses to avail itself of prior and up to adoption of a plan. Third, "take into account" is vague and
lends itself to an interpretation of implied discretion more than "on the basis of." The latter phrase
20081
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plan monitoring program; whereas such changes formerly required plan
amendment (triggering public participation and NEPA analysis require-
ments),1 7 the new rule permits agency officials to change a monitoring
program by administrative correction.' 8 The 2007 Rule dispenses with
the species viability and MIS requirements entirely, replacing these re-
quirements with broad language requiring plans "describe the monitoring
219program" to be adopted for a planning area.
2. Adaptive Management and Environmental Management Systems
("EMS")
The 2007 Rule embraces adaptive management, 22 a cyclic approach
to natural resource management that "contemplates contingent or provi-
sional resource management decisions, which are then subject to revision
to accommodate scientific uncertainty. '22' To this end, the 2007 Rule
requires that managers "establish an environmental management system
[EMS] for each unit of the National Forest System., 222 EMS is a "proce-
dure designed to audit an individual forest's overall environmental per-
formance, 223 and is based on environmental standards developed by the
International Organization for Standardization ("ISO").224 Many scien-
tists have argued in favor of adaptive management,225 citing the problem-
atic nature of "the one-time decision, prediction based NEPA model. 226
Others believe the agency's adoption of "adaptive management" is a
pretext for a return to policies maximizing timber harvests.227 The "ISO
14001" standard on which EMS is to be based 228 notably "does not spec-
ify levels of environmental performance, 229 a fact which lends credence
to these reservations. The Forest Service's historical predilection for
implies agency decision making driven by science as opposed to agency politics, budgetary pres-
sures, or public opinion. If plans are to be "based on" available science, the Service is, at least, tied
to a specific methodology with regard to the role of science in planning. On the other hand, the
"take into account" language does not imply such constraints on agency discretion, for better or
worse.
217. 1982 Rule, 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(0 (1982) (requiring responsible official to follow ordinary
plan adoption procedures where proposed plan amendment would "result in a significant change in
the plan").
218. 2007 Proposed Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. at 48528.
219. Id. at 48536; see also PROCESS PREDICAMENT, supra note 190, at, 24.
220. 2007 Proposed Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. at 48535; PROCESS PREDICAMENT, supra note 190, at
23.
221. Keiter, supra note 187, at 975.
222. 2007 Proposed Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. at 48535.
223. Keiter, supra note 187, at 951.
224. See International Organization for Standardization 14000 Essentials, available at
http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_14000_essentials (last visited Feb. 2, 2008) [hereinafter ISO 14000 Es-
sentials].
225. Nie, supra note 189, at 106 (discussing the Committee of Scientists report and "dozens of
scholarly books and articles" calling for adoption of adaptive management by the Forest Service).
226. Id.; see also PROCESS PREDICAMENT, supra note 190, at 23-24.
227. See, e.g., Nie, supra note 189, at 106.
228. 2007 Proposed Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. 48514-01, 48535 (Aug. 23, 2007) (to be codified at 36
C.F.R. pt. 219); ISO 14000 Essentials, supra note 224.
229. ISO 14000 Essentials, supra note 224.
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placing timber harvesting above all other uses230 lends credence to con-
cerns about a potential return to intensive timber harvesting. Although
adaptive management may be a good idea, there is reason to fear agency
misuse of the considerable flexibility the approach provides.
3. Biodiversity
Congress inserted a biodiversity provision in NFMA 231 requiring the
Forest Service to provide for "diversity of plant and animal communi-
ties" in planning and adoption of planning regulations.232 This provision
was subject to qualifying language, however, as planning remained tied
to satisfaction of "overall multiple-use objectives" and the adoption of
guidelines for preservation of tree species diversity was required only
"where appropriate" and "to the degree practicable." 233 Section 219.26
of the 1982 Rule adopted the NFMA language almost verbatim, though
notably omitting some of the qualifying language.
234
Section 219.26, and the species viability requirement of Section
219.19,235 imposed meaningful substantive requirements on forest plan-
ners to provide for both species and ecosystem diversity. By contrast,
the 2007 Rule transfers specific requirements for species diversity from
the planning regulations to Forest Service manuals ,236 authorizes but does
not require forest plan provisions for species diversity, 237 and couches
both ecosystem and species diversity language in a "sustainability" pro-
vision instructing the Service to balance "[s]ocial, economic, and eco-
logical" dimensions of sustainability in developing forest plans.23' Di-
versity provisions in the new planning regulations leave the agency with
a significant amount of discretion to determine how, and to what extent,
plans must include provisions ensuring biodiversity; although the pro-
posed rule "acknowledge[s]" the agency's "diversity obligations," it does
not impose "specific and, thus, enforceable protective duties" on the
agency at "either the planning or project levels.,
239
230. See supra notes 88-130 and accompanying text.
231. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1604(g)(3)(B) (2008).
232. Keiter, supra note 187, at 946.
233. § 1604(g)(3)(B).
234. Compare id., with 1982 Rule, 36 C.F.R. § 219.26 (1982).
235. 1982 Rule, 36 C.F.R. § 219.19.
236. See 2007 Proposed Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. 48514-01, 48530 (Aug. 23, 2007) (to be codified at
36 C.F.R. pt. 219).
237. Id. at 48538.
238. Id. This approach is antithetical to the 2000 rule, which exalted biodiversity above other
values. See sources cited supra note 199-201.
239. Keiter, supra note 187, at 963. Although Keiter writes about the now-enjoined 2005 Rule,
his discussion is entirely applicable to the 2007 Rule, as the latter's biodiversity language is bor-
rowed from the language of the former word for word. Compare 2005 Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 1023,
1059 (2005), with 2007 Proposed Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. at 48538.
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4. Public Participation and Collaboration
Section 219.6 of the 1982 Rule contemplated forest planning deci-
sions made on an "information base ... broaden[ed]" by public partici-
pation.240 The rule provided for public input in the earliest stages of
planning, imposing clear procedural requirements for public participa-
tion during the NEPA process 242 in addition to NFMA-specific notice
and comment requirements, which included "meetings, conferences,
seminars, workshops, tours, and similar events designed to foster public
review and comment., 243 The rule also required the Forest Service to
analyze public input by issue and geographical area, noting "the variety
and intensity of viewpoints about ongoing and proposed planning and
management standards and guidelines." 244 By contrast, the 2007 Rule
provisions on public participation are more permissive, requiring the
Forest Service to use "a collaborative and participatory approach" 245 in
planning and provide for public notice and comment periods but leaving
the "methods and timing of public involvement opportunities" to the
agency.246 Because the new rules categorically exclude forest planning
from NEPA analysis, 247 they relieve the agency of public participation
obligations triggered by completion of an EIS.248
5. NEPA Compliance
Where the 1982 Rule explicitly required completion of an EIS for
forest plans,249 the new rule permits the responsible official to categori-
cally exclude forest plan approval, amendment, or revision from in-depth
environmental analysis requisite for completion of an EIS or an EA.
Although the new rule provides that completion of an EIS or EA may
still be required at the project level,251 this requirement is illusory, as the
Forest Service is legally authorized to categorically exclude site-specific
projects. 2" Because the 2007 Proposed Rule also eliminates regional
240. 1982 Rule, 36 C.F.R. § 219.6(a)(1).
241. Id. §§ 219.6(b)-(c).
242. See id. § 219.6(b).
243. See id. § 219.6(d).
244. See id § 219.6(e).
245. See 2007 Proposed Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. at 48537.
246. See id.
247. See id. at 48526.
248. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.7, 1502.9, 1502.19, 1503.4, 1506.6 (2007).
249. See 1982 Rule, 36 C.F.R. §§ 219.12(a), (f)-(k).
250. See 2007 Proposed Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. at 48535.
251. See id.
252. See Colo. Wild. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 435 F.3d 1204, 1221-22 (10th Cir. 2006) (affirming
agency's categorical exclusion of major timber sales where agency decision not to do ElSs was not
arbitrary and capricious); Joshua Nathaniel, Survey, Forests on Fire: The Role of Judicial Over-
sight, Forest Service Discretion, and Environmental Regulations in a Time of Extraordinary Wildfire
Danger, 84 DENV. U. L. REv. 923, 937-39 (discussing 2003 announcement of the Healthy Forests
Initiative [HFI] and passage of the Healthy Forests Restoration Act [HFRA] and categorical exclu-
sions of major timber harvests from NEPA analysis under HFI and HFRA); Nie, supra note 189, at
102 (discussing Forest Service's categorical exclusion of major timber sales).
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planning253 required under the 1982 Rule,254 categorical exclusion of
both forest plans and site-specific projects may eliminate scientific
evaluation of cumulative impacts from the planning process entirely,
providing only for piecemeal review of individual parts of the manage-
ment scheme without any review of large-scale environmental effects.
255
The 2007 Proposed Rule's provision permitting changes to forest plans
by administrative correction gives the agency another potential opportu-
nity to evade in-depth NEPA analysis.
256
6. Timber Management
The 2007 Rule's dramatic attempt to increase Forest Service plan-
ning discretion is reflected in its elimination of the diversity provision of
the 1982 Rule covering "tree species. 257 The 1982 Rule regulated silvi-
cultural practices to a significant degree,258 and required the Forest Ser-
vice to study the ecological effects and economic implications of its tim-
ber harvesting practices in detail. 259 By contrast, the 2007 Rule lacks
specific timber harvesting standards, continuing to require the agency to
designate areas suitable for timber harvesting but removing most detailed
information, such as the method for determining harvest volumes, to
Forest Service directives. 260 Taken together with the 2007 Rule's cate-
gorical exclusion of forest plans from NEPA analysis, 26' and the increas-
ingly frequent categorical exclusion of substantial site-specific timber
harvests,262 the timber provisions of the 2007 Rule leave the Forest Ser-
vice remarkable discretion to determine the proper scope of timber har-
vesting in the national forests.
7. Overview of Planning Reforms
It is fair to say the 2007 Rule weakens the Forest Service's planning
obligations considerably in comparison to the 1982 Rule. Specific re-
quirements in the 1982 Rule on NEPA compliance,263 biodiversity,26 and
timber harvest practices 265 are absent from both the 2005 Rule and the
2007 Proposed Rule. In total, the 2005 and 2007 Rules contain more
253. See 2007 Proposed Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. at 48535.
254. See 1982 Rule, 36 C.F.R. § 219.4(b)(2).
255. See Keiter, supra note 187, at 970-71.
256. See 2007 Proposed Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. at 48537.
257. See 1982 Rule, 36 C.F.R. § 219.26.
258. See id.
259. See 1982 Rule, 36 C.F.R. § 219.14.
260. See 2007 Proposed Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. at 48530.
261. See supra notes 248-57 and accompanying text.
262. See, e.g., supra note 253 and accompanying text.
263. The 1982 Rule required completion of an EIS for each forest plan adopted. See 1982
Rule, 36 C.F.R. § 219.12(a), (f)-(g), (j).
264. See 1982 Rule, 36 C.F.R. § 219.26.
265. 1982 Rule, 36 C.F.R. § 219.14. The 1982 Rule mandated cost-benefit review of produc-
tion on lands identified for potential timber harvest. See § 219.14(b).
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generalized language intended to afford the agency greater flexibility,
266
eschewing the prescriptive standards that guided planning, to a greater or
lesser degree, under the 1982 Rule.267 Where planners were formerly
constrained by substantive requirements embedded in the planning regu-
lations, 268 the new rule transfers considerable discretion on "whether and
how to change" unit-level forest plans
269 to agency officials.270
These changes may have dangerous effects on the political relation-
ship between Forest Service management and budgeting: agency man-
agers will be tempted to use their new discretion to curry favor among
political factions in Congress, and broad agency planning discretion will
help these interests maximize returns on political capital, encouraging
political interference with the agency.271  As Wilkinson notes, concepts
like sustainability, ecosystem management, and biodiversity really only
"gain specific meaning when they are applied in discrete contexts.' 272
Whether the dangers raised by the 2007 Rule's adoption of a flexibility-
oriented "adaptive management" approach lead to irresponsible practices
will depend on future interpretations of the new rule's wide-open lan-
guage.273
B. Assessing Some Potential Effects of the 2007 Proposed Planning Rule
Forest planning is essential to effective management of an adminis-
trative unit as massive as the National Forest System.274 NFMA's im-
plementation of comprehensive land use planning fairly revolutionized
forest management, for good or ill.275 On the other hand, the view of the
2007 Rule that forest plans are purely aspirational and make no man-
agement decisions raises serious questions as to the value of public par-
ticipation in the planning process and the scope of agency discretion in
the future. The dramatic and controversial changes to planning proposed
in the 2007 Rule are virtually certain to trigger litigation as expanded
discretion in the agency raises reasonable fears abuse.276
266. See, e.g., 2007 Proposed Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. 48514, 48515-16 (Aug. 23, 2007) (to be
codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 219); see also, Nie, supra note 189, at 100.
267. See Keiter, supra note 187, at 249-50.
268. See, e.g., 1982 Rule, 36 CFR § 219.19 (imposing species viability and management indi-
cator species requirements on Forest Service).
269. 2007 Proposed Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. at 48536.
270. See id. at 48535.
271. See HIRT, supra note 85, at 295-96.
272. Wilkinson, supra note 188, at 679; see also Keiter, supra note 187, at 960-61 (discussing
the open-ended nature of statutory language in federal public land and wildlife laws and the agen-
cies' role in defining the scope of statutory terminology); Nie, supra note 189, at 104.
273. See Nie, supra note 189, at 104.
274. See, e.g., Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 728 (1998) (noting Forest
Service jurisdiction encompasses "nearly 300,000 square miles of land located in 44 states, Puerto
Rico, and the Virgin Islands.").
275. See Wilkinson, supra note 188, at 669-77 (discussing changes in national forest manage-
ment and forest conditions since passage of NFMA).
276. See, e.g., HMRT, supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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1. Public Policy: Improving the Utility of Forest Planning Under
the 2007 Rule
Development and adoption of a forest plan is a costly, time-
consuming, and remarkably complex undertaking. 277 The Forest Service
estimates its annual planning and assessment costs to be roughly $250
million, more than twenty percent of its yearly budget.278 Planners cur-
rently engage in extensive scientific analysis and documentation; re-
peated, lengthy public comment periods over the course of the planning
process are the norm. Adoption of forest plans used to require comple-
tion of an EIS,279 an enormous undertaking in itself given an EIS must
consider in painstaking and voluminous detail multiple alternatives to the
proposed plan.280 ESA requirements also generate impact studies, consul-
tations, and additional planning.28 1 Simply because plan development
requires such a massive investment of agency resources, the process
raises questions as to its own value.282
Forest planning under the old regulations presented other problems.
Plans must be revised at least once every fifteen years 283 but can take
almost as long to complete.284 The science supporting plan content be-
comes outdated relatively quickly. 285 The "one-time decision approach"
embodied in adoption of a fifteen-year forest plan is arguably incompati-
ble with forest-level planning given the dynamic nature of forest condi-
tions.286 Completing an EIS presents a host of problems. The agency
must expend considerable resources analyzing the ecological effects of
hypothetical projects under hypothetical forest conditions, lacking suffi-
cient data on conditions and projects fifteen years in the future.2 87 Data
277. See, e.g., Roger A. Sedjo, Streamlining Forest Service Planning, in NEW APPROACHES ON
ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 101 (Richard D. Morgenstern and Paul R. Portney, eds., 2004)
available at http://www.fs.fed.us/ems/includes/article3.pdf.
278. See PROCESS PREDICAMENT, supra note 190, at 34; see also Jodi Peterson, The End of
'Analysis Paralysis'?, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Feb. 19, 2007, available at
http://www.hcn.org/servlets/hcn.Article?articleid=16838 ("Each [forest] plan took five to seven
years of effort and cost around $5 million to $7 million.").
279. See Citizens for Better Forestry v. USDA, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1067-68 (N.D. Cal.
2007). Compare 1982 Rule, 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(b) (1983), with 2005 Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 1023,
1032, 1056 (Jan. 5, 2005), and 2007 Proposed Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. 48514, 48535 (Aug. 23, 2007) (to
be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 219).
280. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.12-1502.16 (2008).
281. See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
282. See William J. Wailand, Note: A New Direction? Forest Service Decisionmaking and
Management of National Forest Roadless Areas, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 418, 428 (2006); Wilkinson,
supra note 188, at 681.
283. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1604(f)(5) (2008); 1982 Rule, 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(g).
284. Interview by Ray Suarez with Rick Cables, U.S. Forest Service Regional Forester, Region
2, Newshour with Jim Lehrer: Forest Rules (PBS television broadcast Dec. 23, 2004) (transcript
available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/environmentljuly-dec04/forestI 2-23.html).
285. See, e.g., 2005 Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 1023, 1041 (Jan. 5, 2005).
286. See id. at 1031 (discussing 1997 Committee of Scientists criticisms of the use of EIS at
the forest plan level).
287. Id. (discussing the speculative nature of plan content where agency realizes "over the 15-
year life of a plan it can only expect the unexpected.").
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collection on present conditions is difficult to obtain given the size of
forest units and detail necessary to make forest-level environmental
analysis useful at the project level; planning-level NEPA analysis is typi-
cally duplicated at the project level.28 8 These are precisely the practical
difficulties the agency wishes to address by revising its planning rules for
maximum discretion and flexibility.
2. Public Participation in the Planning Process Under the 2007 Pro-
posed Rule
Because the 2007 Rule leaves so much of the planning process
solely to the Forest Service's discretion, 89 it calls into question the value
of public participation in plan development. Aside from legal obliga-
tions imposed by NFMA (and NEPA, ESA, etc.) and the planning rules,
the Forest Service has maintained considerable discretion to determine
rule and plan content regardless of the tenor of public comments on a
given issue.290 Obviously, that discretion is significantly broadened
where sources of legal obligation are weakened or abandoned. The pub-
lic participation obligations in the 2007 Rule are fairly hollow. Typical
notice and comment is provided for at plan adoption, amendment, and
revision, but the agency is under no obligation to base the plan on that
input.29' Despite requirements to consult with and provide for open and
meaningful participation by the public in the planning process, the rule
also gives the responsible official "the discretion to determine the meth-
ods and timing of public involvement opportunities. 292 Transforming
forest plans from prescriptive, theoretically enforceable instruments into
purely "aspirational," non-binding documents allows the Forest Service
to maximize flexibility without visibly shutting the public out of the
planning process. Unfortunately, marginalizing public input may en-
courage capture of the planning process by the interest groups whose
input the agency has tried to manage in the past.293
C. Future Implications and the Agency Discretion Question
Following Ohio Forestry and Norton, the Forest Service realizes the
planning issue is an important key to maximizing its managerial discre-
288. See id. (noting difficulties with data collection over the breadth of national forest system
and management units and duplication of NEPA analysis at planning and project levels).
289. See 2007 Proposed Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. 48514, 48516 (Aug. 23, 2007) (to be codified at 36
C.F.R. pt. 219) ("Land management plans are strategic" and "do not command anyone to do any-
thing or to refrain from doing anything... do not grant, withhold, or modify any formal legal li-
cense, power, or authority... do not subject anyone to any civil or criminal liability [or] create legal
rights or obligations.").
290. See Nie, supra note 189, at 104.
291. See 2007 Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. at 48537-38.
292. Id.
293. Interview by Ray Suarez with Rick Cables, U.S. Forest Service Regional Forester, Region
2, The Newshour with Jim Lehrer: Forest Rules (PBS television broadcast Dec. 23, 2004) (transcript
available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/environment/july-decO4/forest 12-23.html). These are
the "paid gladiators" Cables mentions.
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tion.2" The 2007 Proposed Rule vests the agency with unprecedented
planning discretion, categorically exempting plans from NEPA,295 insu-
lating the agency from plan-level challenges under that statute, and ex-
pressly categorizing plans as "non-actions,,, 296 possibly blocking the ESA
challenges upheld in the Ninth Circuit and other challenges made under
the APA. Where Forest Guardians boxes off the timing of triggering of
the consultation obligation, limiting the list of triggering events to adop-
tion, amendment, or revision of a plan or plan approval of a site-specific
decision,297 the new Forest Service rule renders forest plans potentially
unreviewable.
Where project-level categorical exclusions are upheld on review, or
expressly authorized by Congress or the Executive Branch, 298 maximiz-
ing agency discretion may mean agency actions evade all in-depth NEPA
review. NEPA "guarantees a particular procedure, not a particular re-
sult. ' 299 Because an agency's failure to comply with NEPA procedures
injures potential litigants as soon as it occurs, NEPA can provide a strong
basis for satisfying standing.300 Categorically excluding major projects
from NEPA analysis under color of law potentially eliminates this reli-
able and important means of obtaining review. The Forest Service will
not hesitate to categorically exclude site-specific projects of considerable
magnitude from NEPA analysis.30'
To the extent the 2007 Rule removes important plan content to the
302administrative directive level, courts may view that content as "inter-
pretive" and intended to "clarify" policy, engaging in very deferential
review and frustrating citizen challenges to unit-level management.3 3
Standing issues arising under federal land management statutes are likely
294. See 2007 Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. at 48516 (citing Ohio Forestry and Norton for the proposi-
tion that forest plans are not agency action).
295. Id. at 48535.
296. Id. at 48516.
297. See Forest Guardians v. Forsgren, 478 F.3d 1149, 1154, 1156 (10th Cir. 2007).
298. See Nathaniel, supra note 252, at 937-39 (discussing categorical exclusions of major
timber harvests under HFI and HFRA).
299. Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 737 (1998). But see Thomas v. Peter-
son, 753 F.2d 754, 763 (9th Cir. 1985).
300. Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 737.
301. See National Environmental Policy Act Documentation Needed for Limited Timber
Harvest, 68 Fed. Reg. 44598 (July 29, 2003) (authorizing categorical exclusion of three types of site-
specific actions: 70 acre live tree harvests with /2 mile of road construction; 250 acre salvage of
dead/dying trees with V2 mile of road construction; and 250 acre commercial harvest "of any trees
necessary to control the spread of insects and disease" with '2 of road building); Nie, supra note 189,
at 103 (discussing HFRA's authorization of project-level NEPA categorical exclusions).
302. See, e.g., 2007 Proposed Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. 48514, 48537 (Aug. 23, 2007) (to be codified
at 36 C.F.R. pt. 219) (providing for changes to monitoring program and program information by
administrative correction); id. at 48536 (providing for a variety of changes to plan content by admin-
istrative correction, including timber management projections and other "non-substantive" changes).
303. See Citizens for Better Forestry v. USDA, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1078-80 (N.D. Cal.
2007) (holding Forest Service did not violate APA by issuing a 2004 rule without notice and com-
ment as that rule clarified applicability of various planning regulations to agency planning and was
interpretive in nature).
2008]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
to suffer scrutiny in the courts, given standing falls squarely within the
scope of traditional jurisprudential concerns, 304 but agency statutory in-
terpretations and administrative decisions are commonly afforded defer-
ence on review.30 5 Although the Ninth Circuit continues to view forest
plans as challengeable on an ongoing basis,30 6 the court is in the minor-
ity. 30 7  The Supreme Court weighed in on this issue in Ohio Forestry
(originating in the Fourth Circuit), reaching an opinion contrary to the
Ninth Circuit's view, albeit in a slightly different context.308 Various
federal circuits, in addition to the Tenth Circuit, have adopted the Ohio
Forestry-Norton position that forest plans generally do not constitute
ongoing agency action.30 9  The Forest Service's 2005 and 2007 Rules
leave no doubt as to the agency's position on forest planning. Ohio For-
estry and Norton provide the federal circuits ample authority to disallow
"ongoing action" challenges to forest plans as the Tenth Circuit did in
Forest Guardians. Were the Supreme Court to review Forest Guardi-
ans, its decisions in Ohio Forestry and Norton strongly indicate it would
affirm the Tenth Circuit's holding, and perhaps go further and adopt the
Forest Service's position that plans are never agency action.
The new rule does not entirely abandon the older planning ap-
proach. Forest plans under the 2007 Rule will continue to address de-
sired conditions and plan objectives, provide guidelines for project-level
decisionmaking, and identify suitable uses for specific areas within the
planning unit.310  For all the 2007 Rule's faults, "the streamlining and
discretion [it includes] ... may prove... an ingenious way of practicing
the theory of adaptive management in the messy administrative state."
31'
Cutting the red tape involved in plan development is intended to put
304. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-51 (1984).
305. See Norton v. S. Utah Wild. Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 66-67 (2004); Chevron v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984); Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606, 619 (7th Cir. 1995)
(noting scope of review of agency action is narrow and that "court is not permitted to submit its
judgment for that of the agency"); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review ofAgency Inaction: An
Arbitrariness Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1657, 1702-03 (2004); Keiter, supra note 187, at 961
(distinguishing agency regulations and policies and discussing the application of Chevron deference
to agency decisions).
306. See, e.g., Citizens, 481 F. Supp. 2d at 1095 (noting forest plans are ongoing agency action
under § 7(a)(2) of the ESA).
307. See Michael J. Gippert & Vincent L. DeWitte, The Nature of Land and Resource Man-
agement Planning Under the National Forest Management Act, 3 ENVTL. LAW 149, 182-83 (1996)
(noting Eighth Circuit only other to have "expressly found that Forest Plans are reviewable" on an
ongoing basis).
308. Compare Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 733 (1998) (holding chal-
lenge to forest plan unripe where "delayed review would [not] cause plaintiffs hardship... judicial
intervention would inappropriately interfere with further administrative action [and] ... [where) the
courts would benefit from further factual development of the issues presented"), with Pac. Rivers
Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050, 1053-56 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding forest plans constitute ongoing
agency action under the ESA).
309. See Gippert & DeWitte, supra note 307, at 183-86.
310. See 2007 Proposed Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. 48514, 48536 (Aug. 23, 2007) (to be codified at 36
C.F.R. pt. 219).
311. Nie, supra note 189, at 106.
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more agency personnel "on the ground" in the national forests, hopefully
improving agency performance and forest health.31 2 Maximized discre-
tion under the new planning rules logically opens the possibility of a
more ecologically sensitive forest management, not just unenlightened
management geared toward extractive industry.3 13
Unfortunately, the Forest Service wants to streamline the planning
process and simultaneously enact in law the idea that plans have no legal
effect, claiming unprecedented discretion in the process. Perhaps if the
agency took one tack or the other, it might come closer to achieving the
elusive balance between accountability and discretion it has sought over
the years since NFMA's passage. Reforming the planning process to
maximize flexibility and planning effectiveness and efficiency is a good
idea in the abstract, but using forest planning reform as a means to trans-
fer greater authority to the agency, and the planning process as a venue
for unilaterally exercising that authority, is the wrong approach. NFMA
was enacted to constrain Forest Service discretion, not expand it.
314
The Tenth Circuit's approach in Forest Guardians avoids permit-
ting too much agency discretion by preserving judicial review of forest
plans at certain critical times in the planning process. 315 Where Forest
Guardians balances consideration of both the purpose and perils of forest
management, the managerial "paradigm shift ' 316 proposed by the Forest
Service raises the possibility of a return to the unlimited discretion of
317years past. Lynx in both New Mexico and Colorado would be imper-
iled in such an event.
Future plans for Colorado forests are likely to be excluded from
NEPA analysis, 318 removing a significant, program-level layer of mana-
gerial protection for critical habitat of the lynx and other threatened and
endangered wildlife. The Forest Service will amend forest plans by ad-
ministrative correction 319 rather than formal notice-and-comment proce-
dures contemplated by NFMA and NEPA. Given that the 2007 Rule
expressly disclaims any binding effects of forest plans, 320 the agency will
probably be able to convince the Tenth Circuit that its forest plans do not
constitute ESA Section 7(a)(2) action even at adoption, amendment, or
312. See Interview by Ray Suarez with Rick Cables, U.S. Forest Service Regional Forester,
Region 2, Newshour with Jim Lehrer: Forest Rules (PBS television broadcast Dec. 23, 2004) (tran-
script available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/environment/july-dec04/forest_ 2-23.html).
313. See Nie, supra note 189, at 106.
314. See supra notes 108-130 and accompanying text.
315. See Forest Guardians v. Forsgren, 478 F.3d 1149, 1154-56 (10th Cir. 2007) (noting forest
plans are subject to judicial review at adoption, amendment, or revision, or when making site-
specific decisions).
316. See 2005 Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 1023, 1033 (Jan. 5, 2005).
317. See supra notes 92-111 and accompanying text.
318. See 2007 Proposed Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. 48514, 48535 (Aug. 23, 2007) (to be codified at 36
C.F.R. § 219.4(b)).
319. Id. at 49536 (permitting plan amendment by administrative correction).
320. Id. at 48535.
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revision: in other words, that forest plans are legally meaningless. To
the extent Forest Guardians symbolizes a cautious approach to limiting
Forest Service statutory obligations, there is no guarantee this approach
will be the primary one the court uses in the future.
CONCLUSION
Forest Guardians provides a bright-line rule respecting the legal
function (or lack thereof) of forest plans, consistent in kind, if not degree,
with the Forest Service's admittedly radical32' approach to the new rules
but free of the rules' excesses. Under Forest Guardians, citizens seeking
to challenge forest management as environmentally inadequate must base
their claims on site-specific projects (or plans approving such projects) as
opposed to unit-level plans, or on adoption, amendment, or revision of a
plan.322 The 2007 Rule, by contrast, may be easily read to preclude any
substantive review of forest plans. It categorically excludes all facets of
planning from NEPA, and will result, in many if not most cases, in plan
content so vague as to be of little practical or legal effect. Assuming the
2007 Proposed Rule is adopted as a final rule, it now appears Forest Ser-
vice actions under the new management regime will determine whether
the new discretion benefits our national forests or revives the irresponsi-
ble, timber-centric practices of years past.
Following the Tenth Circuit decision, Forest Guardians petitioned
FWS to list the lynx under ESA in New Mexico. 323 The group's petition
noted that suitable lynx habitat extends along the San Juan Mountains
from the release areas in Colorado into New Mexico, and that at least six
of approximately 81 lynx to enter New Mexico have been killed.32 4
Given FWS's 2003 Clarification of the Listing, which explicitly rejected
listing the lynx in New Mexico, the chances for the petition's success are
questionable.325 Should FWS reject the petition, lynx in New Mexico
will have run out of options for acquiring federal protection, at least at
the present time, since Forest Guardians foreclosed a major avenue for
review. Perhaps local Forest Service officials will incorporate special
protections for lynx in the Carson and Santa Fe national forests in their
respective forest plans. On the other hand, such action is unlikely to bind
the Forest Service under present case law, and certainly will not bind the
agency once the 2007 Rule is finalized. Pending judgment on the peti-
321. See Citizens for Better Forestry v. USDA, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2007)
("By the USDA's admission, the 2005 Rule 'embodies a paradigm shift in land management plan-
ning."').
322. See Forest Guardians v. Forsgren, 478 F.3d 1149, 1159-60 (10th Cir. 2007).
323. See FOREST GUARDIANS, PETITION TO CHANGE THE LISTING STATUS OF CANADA LYNX
TO ENCOMPASS THE MOUNTAINOUS REGION OF NORTH-CENTRAL NEW MEXICO 3 (2007), available
at http://www.fguardians.org/supportdocs/petition-canada-lynx_8-1-07.pdf.
324. Id. at 1-2.
325. See Notice of Remanded Determination of Status for the Contiguous United States Dis-
tinct Population Segment of the Canada Lynx, 68 Fed. Reg. 40076, 40083 (2003).
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tion, the Forest Service now holds the cards concerning survival of the
lynx in New Mexico. In the coming years, concerned citizens seeking to
preserve lynx on federal wild lands will have to rely on the agency's
good judgment, as whatever actions the Forest Service takes--or de-
clines to take-are likely to evade judicial review as the agency strives
for maximum discretion.
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